In this note we provide a new proof for the results of Lipton et al. [3] on the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium with logarithmic support size. Besides its simplicity, the new proof leads to the following contributions:
Introduction
The problem of the existence of a small-support approximate equilibrium (i.e., every player randomizes among small set of his actions) has been studied in the literature for the past two decades. Althofer [1] considered two-player zero-sum games and showed existence of approximately optimal strategies with support of size O(log m), where m is the number of actions. Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [3] later generalized this result to all two-player games;
i.e., they showed existence of an approximate equilibrium with support of size O(log m). This result yields an exhaustive search algorithm for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium with a quasi-polynomial running time (m log m ). This is the best-known bound today for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium. Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4] generalized the technique of Lipton et al. [3] to prove that in two-player games an approximate Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in games that possess a small-probabilities Nash equilibrium (see definition in Section 4).
The related problem of the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (an equilibrium with the minimal support) in subclasses of games has been studied in the literature for much longer; see, e.g., Rosenthal [7] and Shmeidler [8] .
A recent paper by Azrieli and Shmaya [2] analyzes the relation between the influence that a player has on the payoffs of other players and the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium. They show that if the influence is small enough, then such a game has an approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
In this note we provide a new proof for the results of Lipton et al. [3] and Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4] using similar techniques to those developed by Azrieli and Shmaya [2] . Besides its simplicity, the new proof leads to the following contributions:
1. For n-player games we improve the bound on the size of the support of an approximate Nash equilibrium from O(n 2 log m) (see Lipton et. al. [3] )
to O(n log m) (see Corollary 1).
2. We generalize the result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4] from two-player games case to all n-player game cases (see Corollary 3).
3. We provide a logarithmic bound (O(log n + log m)) on the size of the support of approximate Nash equilibrium in the case of graphical games.
This bound is novel (see Theorem 1).
The note is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the notations and preliminaries that will be useful in our new proof. In Section 3 we state and prove the a result on graphical games; this result generalizes Lipton et al. [3] . In Section 4 we state and prove the result that generalizes the result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou. Section 5 is a discussion.
Preliminaries
We consider n-player games where every player i has a large number of actions. For simplicity, we will consider the case where all players have the same number of actions 1 m. We will use the following standard notations.
We denote by A i = {1, 2, ..., m} the actions set of player i, and by A = × i A i the actions profile set. The simplex ∆(A i ) is the set of mixed strategies of player i. We will assume that the payoffs of all players are in [0, 1], and
will denote the payoff function of player i. The payoff function
, which is also called the game. A mixed action profile x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) is an Nash ε-equilibrium if for every action a i ∈ A i , it 1 Given a game where player i has m i actions, we can consider an equivalent game where every player has m = max i m i actions. This can be done by adding m − m i strictly dominated actions to every player i.
A mixed strategy
, where c j ∈ N for every j = 1, 2, ..., m. Note that the support of k uniform strategy is of size at most k. A mixed strategy
will be called k-uniform if every x i is k-uniform. We say that the payoff of player i depends on player j if there exists an action profile a −j and a pair of actions a j , a
. A game where the payoff of every player depends on at most d other players will be called a graphical game of degree d. Graphical games, introduced by Kearns et al. [5] , express the situation where players are located on vertices of an underlying graph and their payoffs are influenced only by their neighbors' actions. Note that every n-player game is a graphical game of degree n − 1.
Lipschitz games
Player i has a λ-Lipschitz payoff function if |u i (a j , a −j ) − u i (a ′ j , a −j )| ≤ λ for every i = j and every a j , a ′ j ∈ A j . The Lipschitz property means that a change of strategy of a single player j = i has little effect on the payoff of player i. Note that player i can have a big effect on his own payoff. A game will be called λ-Lipschitz if the payoff functions of all players are λ-Lipschitz.
The following proposition is an important property of λ-Lipschitz games. Proposition 1. If in an n-player game the payoff of player i depends on at most d players, and his payoff function is λ-Lipschitz, then for every pure action a i ∈ A i and for every mixed action profile of the opponents x −i , it holds that
where B ⊂ A −i is defined by
In simple words, Proposition 1 claims that if we randomize an action profile a −i according to x −i , then probably player i will have approximately the same outcome if he plays against a −i or against x −i .
Proposition 1 is based on the concentration of measure phenomena for
Lipschitz functions (see Ledoux [6] ) and it is derived explicitly in Azrieli and
From general games to Lipschitz games
We present a very natural procedure that constructs for every game a corresponding game with the Lipschitz property.
Fix k ∈ N. Given a game u we construct a new game v = v(u, k) with kn players as follows. We "split" every player i into a population of k players i(1), i(2), ..., i(k). Each player i(j) plays the original game u against the aggregate behavior of the n − 1 other populations of size k.
Formally, it will be convenient to present A i as the set of vectors (P2) Every pure Nash ε-equilibrium of the game v corresponds to a kuniform mixed Nash ε-equilibrium of the game u. The corresponding mixed equilibrium will be the one where player i plays the aggregated strategy of population i in the game v. Usually graphical game models consider games with a large number of players n of constant degree d. Theorem 1 proves the existence of a relatively simple approximate Nash equilibrium where every player uses a strategy with a support that is logarithmically small on n and m.
Lipton et al. [3] show that in every n-player game with m actions for every player there exists a k-uniform Nash ε-equilibrium for k = O(n 2 log m).
Theorem 1 applied to general games shows that in such games there exists a k-uniform Nash ε-equilibrium for k = O(n log m).
Corollary 1. Every n-player game of with m actions for every player has a k-uniform Nash ε-equilibrium for k = 8 ε 2 (n − 1)(log n + log m).
As a straightforward corollary of this result, we derive the following improvement to the oblivious algorithm for computing Nash approximate equilibrium in games with n players.
ε 2 (n − 1)(log n + log m). Then the oblivious algorithm 4 that exhaustively searches over the k-uniform strategies finds an ε-equilibrium in O(m n 2 log m ) steps.
5
Proof of Theorem 1. Let k = 8 ε 2 d(log n + log m). We construct the game v = v(u, k) as presented in Section 2.2. We prove that the game v possesses a pure Nash equilibrium, then, by Remark 1 (P2) this concludes the proof.
Moreover, we will prove that every nk-player 1/k-Lipschitz graphical game of degree dk has a pure Nash ε-equilibrium.
Consider a mixed action profile x that is a (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium of v. For every player i and every action b ∈ A i of player i, we define the set of action profiles
is a pure Nash ε-equilibrium according to the following inequality:
where the first inequality follows from a * ∈ E i,d , the second from a * i ∈ support(x i ), and the third from a * ∈ E i,a * i . Therefore it is enough to prove that the above intersection is not empty.
By proposition 1 we have
Putting k = 
Small Probability Games
Following the terminology of [4] , a profile of mixed actions x will be called a c-small probabilities profile if x i (j) ≤ c/m for every player i and every j ∈ A i . A game u will be called a c-small probability game if there exists a Nash equilibrium x that is a c-small probability profile.
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4] prove that in small probability twoplayer games the oblivious random algorithm that samples k-uniform strategies for k = Θ(logm) finds an approximate Nash equilibrium in O(c 2 m log c ) steps, i.e., in polynomial time in m. Here we generalize this result to general n-player games.
It will be convenient to think of the k-uniform strategies as a multiset that contains k ordered actions. In such a case the set of k-uniform strategy profiles is of size m kn .
Theorem 2. Let u be an n-player c-small probability games with m actions for every player, and let k = Corollary 3. Fix n and let k = 8 ε 2 (n − 1)(log n + log m). Then the oblivious algorithm that samples at random k-uniform strategies and checks whether it forms an ε-equilibrium finds such an ε-equilibrium in c-small probability games after (nm) Following the same analysis that was done in the proof of Theorem 1 we define the sets E i,b and we know that
Nash ε-equilibria in u. Let us show that there are many different action
Note that x v (a) ≤ (c/m) nk because x is a c-small probabilities profile.
On the other hand,
Therefore, there must be at least
, which yield that there are at least m nk /2c nk different k-uniform Nash ε-equilibria in u.
It only remains to evaluate the expression c nk : Open problem: Does there exist an n-player n-action game where in every Nash approximate equilibrium at least one of the players plays a mixed action with support of size f (n)?
By Althofer [1] the answer to this question for f (n) = c log n is positive.
What about f (n) = cn α for α < 1? What about f (n) = cn?
